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Abstract
Game-theoretic models of network formation typically assume that people create relations so as to maximize their own
outcome in the network. Recent experiments on network formation suggest that the assumption of self-interest might be
unwarranted and that social preferences, such as altruism and inequality aversion, play a role in the formation of social
networks. We developed an experiment to systematically investigate whether people show preferences for outcomes of
others during network formation. We find that such preferences play a role when network decisions degenerate to simple
two-person decision tasks. In more complex environments, however, we find little evidence for social preferences as a
significant decision criterion. Furthermore, we find some evidence for farsighted behavior in network formation.
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Introduction
It has been shown that one’s network position is not without
consequences, having a crucial impact on many aspects of a
person’s life. Labor market outcomes [1,2], job satisfaction [3],
and health outcomes [4] are just a few examples of outcomes that
are influenced by the network structure in which a person is
embedded. Given that networks carry such weight and that people
have some idea about the pattern of relations between others [5], it
has been argued that people will try to maneuver themselves into
optimal positions within the network [6,7]. Empirical evidence
supports this claim. People have been shown to evaluate the
satisfaction with a relationship, costs of the relationship in terms of
time and energy, quality of alternatives, past investments, and
expected future of relationships when deciding on how much to
invest in the relationship [8,9]. Next to this, the assumption of
purposive network formation can explain specific relational
patterns found in the former GDR (East Germany) [10–12], and
differences in investments in relationships between people in
different European countries [13].
Given that people purposively build relations as to improve their
position in a network, the development of game-theoretic models
to capture this process seems a natural step [14,15]. Broadly
speaking, one can distinguish three lines of research applying game
theory to social networks. First, one can distinguish papers that
investigate how interacting on a fixed network structure influences
actors’ choices in specific games, such as prisoners’ dilemmas or
coordination games [16–19]. Second, one can distinguish papers
that investigate which network structures emerge given particular
payoff functions that map network positions to outcomes
[14,15,20]. Finally, one can distinguish papers that study the co-
evolution of network structure and behavior by studying what
happens when actors play games on endogenous networks in
which they can decide with whom to interact [21–24]. The current
paper belongs to the second line of inquiry. We refer to Buskens et
al. [25] for a more extensive overview of these lines of research and
the distinctions between them.
Game-theoretic models of network formation make it possible to
investigate stable networks depending on the relationship between
the network structure and the actors’ outcomes. Furthermore, by
imposing a specific protocol by which relations are formed, they
allow for an investigation of the formation process leading up to
these stable states. At the level of the individual actor, game-
theoretic models typically assume myopic self-interest. Myopic
implies that actors only consider the direct payoff consequences of
creating or removing a link. Self-interest implies that actors are
assumed to only care about their own outcomes.
Experimental tests of these models indicate that they predict
well when the outcomes are equal for all actors in the predicted
network [26–28], but that the predicted networks are seldom
observed if they provide unequal outcomes over actors [28,29].
Furthermore, in the case where the networks formed coincide with
the set of predicted networks, there appears to be a bias toward
networks that maximize the sum of outcomes and networks in
which everybody is equally well off [26]. In an experiment where
subjects frequently formed a predicted network with highly
unequal payoffs, they showed the unpredicted behavior of
repeatedly rotating which of them had the most beneficial central
position [30,31]. Finally, it has been reported that individual
network decisions are more likely if they increase equality in
outcomes [28,29].
Given that the protocol to form links and the payoff function
used in such experiments closely resemble those applied to acquire
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theoretical results, the discrepancies reported above seem to be
caused by incorrect assumptions regarding individual behavior.
This suggest that, in terms of Coleman’s schema of explanation
[32,33], assumptions regarding individual behavior at the micro
level need to be improved to better understand the emergence of
networks at the macro level. At the same time, the complexity of
interdependencies that exists within networks makes it of crucial
importance that we do not add too much complexity at the
individual level in order to avoid that it becomes infeasible to
derive macro-level implications [34]. Relaxing the assumption of
self-interest is relatively straightforward and seems like a viable
approach given that there is considerable evidence suggesting that
people show pro-social behavior in various contexts [35–37].
Therefore, it may come as no surprise that the incorporation of
social preferences, such as altruism and inequality aversion, into
individual utility functions is the most frequently advocated
remedy to increase predictive and explanatory power of the
game-theoretic models [28–31].
Although the past results point in the direction of social
preferences, explanations relying on rationality related arguments
might also account for the findings reported above. In particular,
one could relax the assumption of myopia instead of the
assumption of self-interest. Due to the complexity of the
interdependencies that exist within networks this option is,
however, more involved. The few papers that have analyzed
farsightedness in network formation show that for this extension it
is not straightforward to derive predictions for individual behavior
and related macro-level outcomes [38–40]. Still, this is no reason
to rule out this approach a priori. Further research on individual
level decision-making is required to determine which of the two
approaches is most promising.
In the current paper we present an exploratory study to inform
the debate on how game-theoretic models of network formation
can best be extended at the micro level. We designed an
experiment to investigate the importance of social preferences in
the complex setting of network formation. In our experiment,
subjects could choose their relations in continuous time in, for
experimental settings, large groups of between 10 and 15 subjects.
In designing our experiment, we focused on two types of social
preferences that dominate the literature, namely: a concern for the
absolute outcome of others, or altruism, and a concern for equality
in outcomes. Subjects faced four different contexts in which
contrasts between these preferences were likely to emerge. We
obtained independent behavioral measures of their social prefer-
ences using the ring game proposed by Liebrand [41], and
investigate whether behavior in the network formation experiment
was related to these social preferences.
Theory
Social preferences
It has long been recognized that in order to understand
situations of social interaction we must allow for the possibility that
people do not only care about their own outcomes, but might
consider others’ outcomes as well. More formally stated, we should
allow for the possibility that (some) people transform the objective
outcome distribution over all people into a subjective utility [42].
Naturally, there exists a myriad of ways in which one can construct
non-standard utility models that incorporate a concern for others’
outcomes. Two such forms of non-standard utility dominate the
literature. The first is a concern for the outcomes of others, or
altruism, next to a concern for own outcomes. Empirical research
indicates that many people show a tendency to care about the
outcomes of others and that the degree to which they do so
predicts their behavior in both experimental games [41,43] and
real life situations such as volunteer work, charitable giving, and
the use of public transportation [44–47]. The second is a concern
for equality in outcomes next to a concern for own outcomes. The
concept of equality has received considerable attention in the
psychological research on justice and equity [48]. More recently,
equality arguments have also been applied to explain major
patterns in data deriving from experiments in economics [49,50].
Based on the dominant approaches in the literature, we focus on
altruistic and equality concerns next to a concern for own
outcomes. While these motives are typically studied in separate
literatures, there is no intrinsic reason why people could not be
sensitive to both sources of utility [51,52]. Indeed, empirical
evidence suggests that actors who are more altruistic also attach a
higher value to equality [52]. Given these preferences, the utility
function of a person i is depicted by equation (1).
Ui~W1i:(ownearning)zW2i:(others
0earnings)z
W3i:(equality)
ð1Þ
Where W1i represents the weight given by person i to own
outcome, W2i is the weight given by person i to others’ outcomes,
and W3i is the weight given by person i to equality.
Hypotheses
If people decide according to a concern for own outcomes (W1i)
together with social preferences positing a concern for others’
outcomes and equality respectively (W2i andW3i) we would expect
some relations in a network to be more likely to be formed and
maintained than others. On average, it can be assumed that W1i,
W2i, and W3i are all positive. This is quite obvious for W1i. We
expect that most, if not all, people prefer more for themselves
compared to less holding others’ outcomes and equality constant.
For W2i, it has been shown that most people are classified as either
caring positively about others’ outcomes or not caring about them
at all; only a small minority can be classified as caring negatively
about others’ outcomes [41,43,52]. Studies applying a continuous
measure for W2i have shown the mean to be positive [52,53].
When it comes to W3i, theories on equality assume that people in
general prefer equal distributions to unequal ones [49,50], which is
corroborated by empirical evidence [54–56]. Based on these
arguments, we hypothesize that:
H1. A subject is more likely to create or maintain a relation, the
more this relation increases her own outcomes in the network.
H2. A subject is more likely to create or maintain a relation, the
more this relation increases others’ outcomes in the network.
H3. A subject is more likely to create or maintain a relation, the
more this relation increases equality in the network.
One of the main points in the social preference literature is that
not everybody has the same preferences. Multiple measurement
methods have been proposed in order to assess social preferences
at the individual level [43,57]. Given that we can measure the
weight that a person attaches to own outcome, others’ outcomes,
and equality independent of their decisions during network
formation, we can construct the following hypotheses.
H4. The more a subject cares about own outcome (i.e., the
larger W1i), the larger the positive effect of own outcomes on the
probability that this subject creates or maintains a relation.
H5. The more a subject cares about others’ outcomes (i.e., the
largerW2i), the larger the positive effect of others’ outcomes on the
probability that this subject creates or maintains a relation.
Individual Choices in Dynamic Networks
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H6. The more a subject cares about equality (i.e., the larger
W3i), the larger the positive effect of equality in outcomes on the
probability that this subject creates or maintains a relation.
In order to test these hypotheses, we developed an experiment
in which subjects interacted in several network formation games
drawn from the game-theoretic network formation literature. In
network formation, comparable to other game-theoretic models,
the assumption of self-interest will be more problematic in some
conditions than in others [58]. When the network formation
process leads towards an efficient and equal network structure if
actors behave according to self-interest, it is relatively unlikely that
actors will face decisions that force them to weight off the
importance they give to own outcomes, others’ outcomes, and
equality. Therefore, it might not matter a great deal whether
actors are purely self-interested or not. When the formation
process heads towards an inefficient and/or unequal network the
preferences that actors have concerning others’ outcomes and
equality are more likely to play a role. Therefore, we imposed
social contexts in which there was likely to be at least some tension
between the aforementioned social preferences.
Two specific models of network formation
In our experiment, we applied a truncated version of the
connections model and the co-author model, both due to Jackson
and Wolinsky [15]. In both models, relations are considered to be
undirected and require consent of both actors involved. In other
words, both actors i and j have to agree for the relation between i
and j to form. We discuss the social context these models represent
and how the different social preferences may come into conflict
during network formation. The expected macro-level outcomes in
these models receive relatively little attention here, but details can
be found in Jackson and Wolinsky [15].
The truncated connections model
Consider a situation in which the network is used to gain
information. Actors receive (valuable) information from direct
contacts and from actors that are at distance two in the network,
where the distance between two actors is defined as the minimum
number of links that have to be passed to get from one actor to the
other. Actors do not receive any valuable information from others
at a distance larger than two. Relations are costly because time
and energy have to be invested in order to maintain a relationship.
Under these assumptions, the outcome an actor receives from a
specific network position can be represented by a truncated
version of the connections model [15]. We denote the number of
direct contacts of actor i with ni, and the number of actors at
distance two with mi. We set the value of a direct contact to a, the
value of an indirect contact at distance two to b, and the cost of a
relation to be c. If a relation is formed, both actors have to pay a
cost c. The outcome pi(g) of actor i is given by equation (2).
pi(g)~a:nizb:mi{c:ni~(a{c):nizb:mi ð2Þ
For the first experimental condition, we applied b.a 2 c.0
(specifically: a 2 c = 1 and b=5). We term this condition
CONLOW, where ‘‘low’’ indicates the relatively low cost for
maintaining relations compared to the other condition that we
applied. Under this condition, a self-interested actor prefers to
connect to actors who have many relationships. By connecting to
an actor with many relations, one gains valuable indirect contacts.
Such behavior is also beneficial for the group as a whole; the
highly centralized star network (in which one actor is related to all
others and there are no further relationships) maximizes the sum
of outcomes [15]. Equality, however, decreases by such behavior
as the central actors bear the cost for all their relationships, making
them worse off than those in the periphery. Figure 1 illustrates how
a process in which everybody connects to the most connected
actor can lead to a highly unequal network. Even though the actor
in the central position is worse off than the others, each relation
still has a positive value to her (a 2 c = 1). Assuming myopic self-
interest, the central actor should thus be willing to create these
relations. If actors value equality, this process might develop
differently because inequality aversion will deter actors from
forming star like structures. If the central actor in the star dislikes
inequality, she will at some point refrain from giving consent for
relationships to form. This is the case because she only benefits
marginally from each additional relationship, while inequality
raises steeply the more centralized the network becomes.
The second condition that we applied in the experiment was
b.0.a 2 c (specifically: a 2 c = 21 and b= 5). We term this
condition CONHIGH. (To avoid that subjects in the experiment
reached negative earnings too easily we increased their baseline
outcome by 5 points.) To see the difference with the CONLOW
condition, Figure 2 shows the outcomes of networks depicted in
Figure 1 in the CONHIGH condition. A self-interested actor still
wants to connect to actors who have many connections in order to
maximize the number of indirect contacts. Now, however, actors
no longer benefit from direct connections and (assuming myopic
self-interest) highly centralized star structures become impossible.
Therefore, the conflict between own outcomes and equality
decreases. On the other hand, a conflict between own outcomes
and altruism may arise. If an actor is altruistic she may be willing
to take a more central position, even though this causes negative
own outcomes and pronounced inequality. It should be noted that
in this setting it takes some farsightedness or some degree of error
for the formation process to get underway if we start from an
empty network, because based on any of the hypothesized
preferences no myopic actor has an incentive to create the first
relation in the empty network. Thus, the empty network is stable.
Other stable networks are networks in which each actor has at
least two relations, and are thus characterized by circle shaped
structures [15].
The co-author model
The co-author model describes the benefits of researchers who
co-author papers [15]. Opposite to the connections model, it deals
with negative externalities. The basic intuition is that a research-
er’s time to spend on a project is inversely related to the number of
projects she is working on. It is advantageous for a researcher to
work on many projects. Researchers, however, prefer that their co-
authors have as few projects as possible, because more projects
make them less productive in each separate project. The outcome
pi(g) of researcher i is given by equation (3) if ni.0 and pi(g) = 0 if
ni=0.
pi(g)~
X
i=jDij~1
1
ni
z
1
nj
z
1
ni:nj
{c
 
~1{ni:cz 1z
1
ni
 
:
X
i=jDij~1
1
nj
ð3Þ
Here, ij indicates that there is a relation between actors i and j, ni
represents the number of projects that i is involved in, nj represents
the number of projects that j is involved in, and c represents an
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additional cost term for the maintenance of a relationship. (To
make the earnings that could be obtained in this setting
comparable to those in the connections model we multiplied the
function by 20.)
In the first setting, we set c=0. This condition, which we term
COALOW, corresponds to the original co-author model of Jackson
and Wolinsky [15]. The network situation can be characterized as
a social dilemma in which every actor has an incentive to build as
many relations as possible, but the social optimum would be to
form mutually exclusive dyads. Because each actor has incentives
to create many relations, the situation easily cascades towards the
complete network, making everybody worse off in the long run. An
example is shown in Figure 3. When everybody has at least one
relationship, adding additional relations in the network decreases
others’ outcomes faster than it increases own outcome. If actors
are altruistic or inequality averse, this might facilitate the
formation of mutually exclusive dyads, and thereby resolve the
social dilemma.
In addition, we set c=0.3: COAHIGH. To see the difference
with the COALOW condition, Figure 4 shows the outcomes of
networks depicted in Figure 3 in the COAHIGH condition. In this
case, it is much more likely that actors stay in mutually exclusive
dyads: if this situation is reached, no actor has an incentive to add
or remove relations. Simulations in which actors were allowed to
add and remove relations in a random order indicated that it is
very unlikely that people actually reach dyads in large groups.
Furthermore, if we assume a self-interested actor, only a small
degree of error is needed in order for her to create an additional
relationship, given that the costs incurred by such a deviation are
relatively small. If an actor is altruistic or inequality averse,
however, such mistakes are much less likely as the resulting drop in
others’ outcomes and equality will have a negative impact on the
actor’s utility.
Experiment
Participants
In total we ran 16 experimental sessions, each of them having
between 9 and 15 subjects. Subjects were contacted using the
Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments [59] to
participate in a study called ‘‘Let’s Connect’’. They were offered
on average J16 but were informed that the exact amount would
depend on their own and others’ decisions. A total of 227 subjects
subscribed for one of the 16 sessions, of which 205 subjects
participated. We allowed at most 16 registrations for each session
and every registered subject who showed up in time participated.
Most subjects were students at Utrecht University from a wide
range of disciplines, although non-student subjects also participat-
ed. Subjects were between 17 and 60 (mean age being 21.6),
68.3% female, and 78.5% Dutch.
All participants in the experiment had previously provided
written consent when signing up online to participate in laboratory
experiments at the ELSE laboratory in Utrecht. In doing so, they
had indicated to having read and agreed to the rules regarding
participation and proper laboratory behavior and the researchers’
commitments and privacy policy. They were also informed that
they could stop participating in the experiment whenever they
wanted. While five of the subjects where 17 years of age, these
were all healthy adult students and no subjects participated who
could seriously be considered minors. Hence, no further consent
from parents or caretakers was obtained.
All data were analyzed anonymously. The nature of this
behavioral experiment, not involving any medical procedure and
not obliging subjects to perform certain acts or behavior, does not
require formal medical ethical approval according to the Dutch
law [60]. This was confirmed by the Advisory Committee under
the Medical Research (Human Subjects) Act of the Faculty of
Social and Behavioural Sciences at Utrecht University.
Figure 1. Examples of outcomes for the CONLOW condition. Shown are a number of outcome examples for the CONLOW condition that we
employed in our experiment. Actors are depicted as circles; outcomes for each actor are denoted within these circles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276.g001
Figure 2. Example of outcomes for the CONHIGH condition. Shown are a number of outcome examples for the CONHIGH condition that we
employed in our experiment. Actors are depicted as circles; outcomes for each actor are denoted within these circles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276.g002
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Procedure
Sessions were conducted in the ELSE laboratory at the
Department of Sociology at Utrecht University. Subjects were
assigned randomly to cubicles and received printed instructions in
the language of their preference, either English or Dutch. The
instructions started by welcoming them to the experiment, stating
that they could ask questions at any time, that they could earn
points during the experiment, and that 100 points equaled 1 Euro
to be paid at the end of the experiment. After this, the instructions
explained the various tasks employed in the experiment.
The experiment was conducted using the z-Tree computer
software package for readymade economic experiments [61]. All
subjects participated for three network formation rounds in each of
the four conditions, implying that they played twelve rounds of
network formation overall. The first round in each condition was a
trial round lasting one and a half minute. This allowed subjects to
gain experience with the particular network formation condition
without it influencing their actual monetary outcomes. After this,
they played two ‘‘real’’ rounds, each lasting five minutes, which
did affect their monetary outcomes. The ordering of conditions
differed between sessions to counterbalance learning between
conditions. In the results section, we investigate whether the
ordering of conditions in the experiment influences the results.
After completing the network formation task, subjects were
presented with the so-called ring game in order to obtain measures
of social preferences [41,43,62] and were administered a small
questionnaire. When finished, the outcomes from the network
formation game and the ring game were added together,
communicated to the subjects, and the subjects received their
earnings in private. The entire process lasted about one and a half
hour and subjects on average received J20.70. Complete
instructions for the experiment are available as an electronic
supplement.
Network formation task
We designed the network formation task in order to maximize
possibilities for analyzing individual decisions. First, we allowed
subjects to change their relations in continuous time with complete
knowledge of what others were doing. Second, we calculated
outcomes in continuous time and continuously updated the
information relating to the outcomes on the screen. Since we are
interested in individual decisions, we wanted to ensure direct
incentives attached to changes in relationships. Third, we allowed
subjects to form networks in larger groups than are typically
employed in experiments on network formation. The reason for
this is twofold. First, it allows for observing more individual
decisions than one would observe in smaller networks. Second,
such a setting is one step closer to a real-world sociological setting
than a network experiment on very small (4 or 6 person) networks.
In the network formation task, all subjects were depicted on the
computer screen (Figure 5). Each subject saw herself depicted as a
(blue) hexagon, while she saw the others depicted as (black) circles.
This allowed subjects to clearly distinguish between themselves
and the other subjects. A subject could propose a relation by
clicking on another subject’s circle and could withdraw an existing
proposal by repeating this action. A proposal had no effect on
outcomes; it merely provided a way in which a given subject could
show another subject her interest in forming a relation. Proposals
were depicted as a blue, thin, directed arrow from the subject
making the proposal to the other subject (see top two arrows in
Figure 5). Because proposals did not matter in determining actual
network positions and outcomes, a proposal was only visible for
the two subjects involved. Given that a proposal existed, it was
possible for a relation to form. After a subject made a proposal for
a relation with another subject, this other subject could create the
relation by clicking on the former subject. A relation was depicted
as a thick, double-headed arrow, colored blue on the screens of the
subjects involved in the relation and black on the screens of the
other subjects. Once a relationship was formed, either subject
could remove it by simply clicking on the other subject.
The amount of seconds left in the current network formation
round was shown in the upper right corner of the screen. The
scenario and round were stated in a bar above the network and
corresponded with the explanations of the specific conditions in
Figure 3. Example of outcomes for the COALOW condition. Shown are a number of outcome examples for the COALOW condition that we
employed in our experiment. Actors are depicted as circles; outcomes for each actor are denoted within these circles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276.g003
Figure 4. Example of outcomes for the COAHIGH condition. Shown are a number of outcome examples for the COAHIGH condition that we
employed in our experiment. Actors are depicted as circles; outcomes for each actor are denoted within these circles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276.g004
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the instructions. This information allowed subjects to easily locate
where they were in the experiment at any point in time (see
Figure 5). After each round, subjects were reshuffled on the screen,
ensuring anonymity between rounds.
The screen also provided insights in what subjects earned.
While outcomes were calculated per second they were shown per
minute because the outcomes per second were very low. Subjects
were clearly explained that outcomes were calculated per second
and that if, for example, they would earn 90 points per minute for
10 seconds they would receive 10/60 times 90 = 15 points for
these 10 seconds. The outcomes per minute for a given subject
were shown at the bottom of the screen and in the blue hexagon.
The outcomes for the other subjects were shown in the black
circles. Next to this, the size of both the hexagon and the circles
changed with the number of points that the subjects earned: larger
in size meaning that the particular subject earned more points per
minute. These shifts in sizes were made to allow subjects to take
the outcomes for others into account in a more intuitive way than
looking purely at numerical values. The subjects only saw what
they and the others were earning individually at that point in time
and did not see any aggregate measures on the sum of outcomes
for the group or the equality of outcomes.
Figure 5. Screenshot of the experiment. The figure depicts the screen that was shown during the network formation experiment. This particular
example is taken from the COAHIGH condition. The subject saw herself depicted as a (blue) hexagon, while she saw the others depicted as (black
circles). Proposals for relations, which did not influence outcomes, were depicted as blue, thin, directed arrows from the given subject making the
proposal to the other subject. Proposals were only visible to the two subjects involved. Relations where depicted as thick, double-headed arrows,
colored blue on the screens of the subjects involved in the relation and black on the screens of the other subjects. In the upper right corner of the
screen, the amount of seconds left in the current network formation round was shown. In a bar above the subjects, the scenario and round were
stated. After each round, subjects were reshuffled on the screen, ensuring anonymity between rounds. The outcomes per minute for the subject were
shown at the bottom of her screen and in the blue hexagon. The outcomes for the other subjects were shown in the black circles. Next to this, the
size of both the hexagon and the circles changed with the number of points that the subjects earned: larger in size meaning that the particular
subject earned more points per minute.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276.g005
Figure 6. The own-other outcome circle used for the ring game.
The plane is defined by two orthogonal dimensions representing own
and other’s outcomes. The center of the ring was placed at the (10,10)
coordinate, with a radius of 10. Subjects had to make 24 choices
between two equidistant own-other outcome distributions located next
to each other on the circle.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276.g006
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Ring game
To test the hypotheses on differences between individuals in the
likelihood to create or maintain a relation, we needed to obtain
independent measures of their social preferences. We used the ring
game [41,43,62] to acquire such measurements.
In the ring game, 24 pairs of own-other outcome sets are
selected from a circle in the own-other outcome plane. This plane
is defined by two orthogonal dimensions representing own and
other’s outcomes. Each of the 24 decisions concerns a decision
between two equidistant own-other outcome distributions located
next to each other on the circle. While the center is typically
placed at the origin, we displaced the center to the (10, 10)
coordinate, and set the radius to be 10, displayed in Figure 6.
Subjects were, for example, asked to choose whether they
preferred 10 for themselves and 20 for the other or 12.6 for
themselves and 19.7 for the other. Earnings awarded by the
choices of other subjects remained concealed until the 24 choices
were completed. We chose to avoid negative outcomes, because
such outcomes were either infeasible (CONLOW, COALOW) or
unlikely (CONHIGH, COAHIGH) in the network formation games.
Next to this, distributions of only positive outcomes are considered
to be easier to evaluate for subjects, and more useful in eliciting
preferences concerning equality [52].
Methods
Analysis strategy
The network formation experiment generated a large amount of
data. In total, the 205 subjects in our experiment made 117,715
decisions (clicks on other subjects). We neglect all decisions made
in the trial rounds and all decisions to create or remove one-sided
proposals for relations, because these decisions did not influence
actual outcomes. After excluding these cases, there are 67,917
decisions left.
In order to be able to analyze these data statistically, we need to
impose some assumptions. Throughout the analyses and in line
with the dominant theoretical approach, we will assume that
subjects are myopic. That is, we assume that subjects purely
consider the current outcomes resulting from a relation when
deciding to create or maintain it.
We reorganize the data into a series of pairwise comparisons. In
particular, we assume that if a change is made in the network, the
subject involved evaluates the situation with and without the
relation and acts according to her preferences. If a change leads to
an undesirable result, it can be reversed immediately. Naturally,
such a reversal must be made within a short time period after the
initial change. If a subject removes a relation multiple seconds or
even minutes after the initial creation, this decision cannot
reasonably be interpreted as the result of a pairwise comparison
of the situation with and without the relation. We, therefore,
analyze whether or not a change is reversed within a short evaluation
period after the initial change. Time is measured in discrete seconds, so
we choose the period in which a change could be reversed as either
being the second in which the change is made or the consecutive
second. In the results section, we investigate whether increasing
the length of the evaluation moment influences our results.
When a subject removes a relation, the pairwise comparison
process and its interpretation are quite straightforward. If a subject
removes a relation and does not reverse this decision, this indicates
that this subject prefers the situation without the relation to the
situation with the relation. If a subject removes a relation and
reverses this decision, this indicates that the subject prefers the
situation with the relation to the situation without the relation. We
omit decision situations in which the other subject removes the
proposal within the evaluation period following the removal of the
link. In these cases the original subject no longer has the
opportunity to recreate the link.
When a subject creates a relation, both subjects involved in the
relation can decide to reverse it because mutual consent is needed.
If the creation of a relation is reversed, this indicates that the
subject that reversed the relation prefers the situation without the
relation to the situation with the relation. If the relation is
maintained, however, this signals that both subjects involved in the
relation prefer the situation with the relation to the situation
without the relation. In the model we cannot add variables for
both subjects because in all other cases there is only one subject
who makes the decision. Therefore, we have to combine the
variables over the two subjects or select one subject as the crucial
decision maker. We decide to take the subject who initiated the
change as the crucial decision maker, since this subject is most
likely to actively evaluate the result of the initial change. In the
results section, we investigate the robustness of our results with
regards to this assumption.
Analysis method
In our analyses, we apply the Thurstone-Mosteller model for
pairwise comparisons [63–68]. We assume that a subject assigns a
utility U to the situation with and the situation without the
relation, shown in equations (4) and (5) below.
Urelation~z
0
relationbzerelation ð4Þ
Unorelation~z
0
norelationbzenorelation ð5Þ
Here z may include both attributes of subjects themselves and
specific aspects of the outcome distribution. In this function z’b
represents the deterministic component of the utility function, and
e represents the random component that can be interpreted as the
part of the utility that cannot be explained by the deterministic
function.
The probability that the situation with a relation is chosen over
the situation without a relation can then be written as shown in
equation (6).
Pr UrelationwUnorelationDzrelation,znorelation,bð Þ
~Pr zrelation{znorelationð Þ0bwenorelation{erelation
  ð6Þ
If we assume that, apart from the hierarchical nesting for which
we control in the analysis, the random terms e are independently
and identically distributed with the type I extreme-value distribu-
tion (see page 59 of Maddala [69]), the probability that a subject
chooses having the relation over not having the relation is given by
equation (7).
Pr UrelationwUnorelationDzrelation,znorelation,bð Þ
~
e zrelation{znorelationð Þ0b
1ze zrelation{znorelationð Þ0b
ð7Þ
Equation (7) corresponds to a binary logit model in which the
independent variables are the differences between the two options.
Because the independent variables are differences between the two
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situations (i.e., with and without the relation), effects for variables
that do not vary between these situations (such as personal
characteristics) are not identified. Still, we can use such variables to
construct interaction effects.
We run separate analyses for each of the four conditions. Also,
we take into account that the observations are nested. Decisions
are nested within directed dyads, which are nested within decision
makers, which are nested within sessions. In order to take this into
account we run hierarchical four-level logistic regression models in
which we estimate random intercepts at each level [70]. By
focusing on one decision maker, we neglect some dependence
between observations. In particular, we neglect dependence
related to the other subject in the dyad. We ran several other
models, e.g., taking the other actor in the dyad as the decision
maker as well as non-hierarchical versions with random effects for
both subjects. All these models led to similar coefficients and
significance levels. Moreover, other random effects are small in
almost all other models. This provides confidence that the most
important random effects are incorporated.
Network variables
The dependent variable is whether (1) or not (0) a relation exists
after an evaluation moment. The first independent variable
comprises the outcome for the decision maker. For altruism, we
look at the sum of others’ outcomes. Denoting the outcome for
subject i in the situation with the relationship under evaluation by
p1i and the outcome for subject i in the situation without the
relation under evaluation by p0i , we compute the outcome
variables as follows:
OwnOutcomei~ln p
1
i{p
0
i
 
, ð8Þ
OthersOutcomesi~ln
X
j=i
p1j{
X
j=i
p0j
 !
: ð9Þ
As can be seen in equations (8) and (9), we compute the natural
logarithm of the differences between the situation with and
without the relation for own outcome and others’ outcomes,
because the distributions of these variables have long and thin tails.
Finally, we operationalize equality as 21 times the standard
deviation in outcomes in the group. The standard deviation
provides a measure for inequality, and reversing it thus provides a
measure for equality. Denoting the average outcomes over all
subjects in the situation with the relation under evaluation by p1,
and the average outcomes over all subjects in the situation without
the relation under evaluation by p0, we compute the equality
variable as follows:
Equality~{1:
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
n
XN
i~1
p1i{p
1
 2
vuut {
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
n
XN
i~1
p0i{p
0
 2
vuut
0
@
1
A: ð10Þ
We use the standard deviation because it has some naturally
appealing qualities. First, it does not heavily rely on the outcome of
the decision maker. Second, the standard deviation increases more
sharply if differences become higher. While in some cases this is a
drawback, because it makes the standard deviation sensitive to
outliers, we believe it is a positive aspect in the current study. It
seems likely that subjects will not care too much about small
differences in outcomes, independent of their social preferences,
but these preferences will be increasingly important if inequality
increases. We have also conducted our analyses using the Fehr and
Schmidt’s model on inequality aversion [50]. Fehr and Schmidt
model a form of self-centered inequality aversion, by assuming that
individuals put a positive weight on the outcomes of those that
earn less than them and a negative weight on the outcomes of
those that earn more than them. These analyses led to similar
conclusions as the analyses presented here.
In the main analyses, we will assume that subjects care about the
outcomes of all others. Alternatively, it is plausible that subjects
focus on only a subset of others. In subsequent robustness analyses,
we will vary the definition of the reference group and investigate
whether this influences our results. In particular, we will allow
subjects to care only about the outcomes of those with whom they
have a relationship or, even more narrowly, only about the specific
other with whom they are currently considering a relationship.
Social preference measurements
We use the 24 decisions that subjects made in the ring game to
measure their social preferences. Van Lange [52] introduced a
simple method to determine the degree to which a subject’s
decisions are influenced by her own outcomes (W1i), others’
outcomes (W2i), and equality (W3i). The total outcome over 24
decisions that a subject allocated to herself and to the other can
vary between 220 and 260. The actual amount allocated is
translated into a weight ranging between 21.00 and 1.00. If a
subject allocated x to the others, the weight attached to the others’
outcome is (x – 240)/20. The weight assigned to own outcomes is
calculated exactly the same. For the weight attached to equality,
we calculate the sum of the absolute difference between own and
others’ outcome over the 24 decisions. The minimum here was
186.56, the maximum was 243.13. Just as above, the weight
attached to equality was rescaled between 1.00 (if the subject
minimized inequality at 186.56) to 21.00 (if the subject
maximized inequality at 243.13). We have also conducted analyses
in which we estimated the subjects’ social preferences towards
altruism and inequality by means of logit analyses. These estimates
correlate very highly with the estimates derived here (Pearson
coefficient over 0.85). Therefore, we use these relatively simple
ways to compute the estimates.
Results
Social preferences
Before we proceed to the findings deriving from the network
experiments, we briefly discuss the outcome of the social
preference measurements, as these measurements serve as inputs
for the subsequent analyses. We find considerable variation in
each of these variables. Furthermore, the means of all three
variables are positive, although not to the degree that one may
have expected. The value given to own outcome varied between 0
and 1, with a mean of 0.83 and a standard deviation of 0.20. The
value given to other’s outcome varied between 20.79 and 1, with
a mean of 0.12 and a standard deviation of 0.29. Finally, the value
given to equality varied between 20.34 and 0.59, with a mean of
0.04 and a standard deviation of 0.16.
Results for the connections model
We start by analyzing the connections model with low cost
(CONLOW). The results are shown in Table 1. Model 1a is the
baseline model, only including a variable indicating whether the
initial change was to create a relation (1) or delete a relation (0),
and a constant. Recall that the dependent variable is whether or
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not a relation exists after an evaluation moment. The idea is that
subjects compare the situation with and without a relation and
choose the situation they prefer. For whatever reason, it might be
that subjects have a tendency to stick to the initial decision to
either create or remove a relation. Therefore, we add the
‘‘creation of relation’’ dummy and the constant. The constant
relates to the likelihood that a subject recreates a relation if the
initial decision was to delete it, the sum of the ‘‘creation of a
relation’’ effect and the constant relates to the likelihood that a
subject maintains a relation if the initial decision was to create it.
In Models 1a and 1b, we see that subjects indeed have a tendency
to stick to the initial decision. The constant is negative indicating
that if the subject initially removed a relation, there is a tendency
not to recreate it. The ‘‘creation of relation’’ effect is positive and
larger than the constant, indicating that if a relation is created
subjects have a tendency to maintain it. These effects are relatively
stable over analyses, and since they do not pertain to the
hypotheses, they will not receive further attention.
In Table 1, Model 2a, we add the variables for own outcome,
others’ outcomes, and equality, as well as the interaction effects of
the aforementioned variables with the associated social preference
measurements derived from the ring game. Note that the social
preferences are subject characteristics and that, therefore, their
main effects are not identified in the pairwise comparison analyses.
We center all variables around their means in order to facilitate
interpretation of the constant and the main effects of outcome
variables. We find that subjects are more likely to choose for
relations, the more these relations increase their own outcomes
and the more these relationships increase others’ outcomes.
Contrary to the predictions, equality has a significant negative
effect suggesting that the more a relation increases equality in the
network, the less likely it is to be created or maintained.
As shown in Model 2a, subjects with a higher value for their
own outcome in the ring game give significantly more weight to
their own outcomes in network formation. Surprisingly, we find
that the value a subject assigns to the other’s outcome according to
the ring game has a significant negative effect on the weight given
to others’ outcomes during network formation. This indicates that
subjects who attach a high value to the outcome of the other
subject in the ring game are less likely to create or maintain
relations that increase others’ outcomes. The interaction relating
to equality is not statistically significant.
Models 1b and 2b in Table 1 show the analyses for the
connections model with high cost (CONHIGH). As in the CONLOW
case, subjects tend to create and maintain relations that increase
their own outcome and decrease the equality in the network.
Contrary to the CONLOW case, the main effect of others’
outcomes is negative; subjects are more likely to create or
maintain links that lower others’ outcomes. With regard to the
interactions, we now find that the importance given to own
outcomes as measured in the ring game is the only preference that
significantly influences decisions. Subjects who give more weight to
own outcomes in the ring game give more weight to own outcomes
in the decision task. The other two interactions effects are not
Table 1. Logistic regression results for the CONLOW and CONHIGH conditions.
CONLOW CONHIGH
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b
Fixed effects
Constant 20.769 (0.000) 20.478 (0.000) 21.157 (0.000) 20.807 (0.000)
Creation of relation 1.938 (0.000) 1.982 (0.000) 2.043 (0.000) 2.078 (0.000)
Own outcome 3.806 (0.000) 2.917 (0.000)
Others’ outcomes 0.242 (0.011) 20.172 (0.050)
Equality 20.202 (0.000) 20.165 (0.000)
W1 * own outcome 0.986 (0.001) 0.729 (0.001)
W2 * others’ outcomes 20.941 (0.001) 20.072 (0.767)
W3 * equality 0.060 (0.691) 0.037 (0.792)
Random effects
Session 0.088 0.086 0.003 0.000
Decision maker 0.097 0.264 0.321 0.348
Directed dyad 1.074 0.589 0.869 0.569
Number of sessions 16 16 16 16
Number of decision makers 205 205 205 205
Number of directed dyads 3778 3778 3672 3672
Number of decisions 21208 21208 19997 19997
Log likelihood 212317.31 29903.68 211525.27 29396.76
The table shows the hierarchical four-level logistic regression estimates on whether (1) or not (0) a relation is present after an evaluation moment in the CONLOW and
the CONHIGH conditions. Creation of relation is a dummy variable indicating whether the initial change was to create a relationship (1) or remove a relationship (0). Own
outcome denotes the natural logarithm of the difference in own outcome between the situation with and without the relationship. Others’ outcome denotes the natural
logarithm of the difference in others’ outcomes between the situation with and without the relationship. Equality denotes the difference in equality between the
situation with and without the relationship. W1 * own outcome, W2 * others’ outcomes, and W3 * equality denote the interaction effects between the aforementioned
variables and the associated social preference measurements derived in the ring game. Both outcome variables and measures of social preference are centered around
their respective means. Random effects are estimated at the level of the session, the decision maker, and the directed dyad under consideration. Numbers of sessions,
decision makers, directed dyads, and decisions are given, as are the log likelihoods. P-values are in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276.t001
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significant. A noteworthy finding, not shown in the tables, is that
for both CONHIGH and CONLOW, almost the entire improvement
in model fit between Models 1 and 2 comes from adding main
effects; the interactions explain little variance in the data.
In short, Hypothesis 1 is supported: subjects are more likely to
have relations that increase their own outcomes. Hypothesis 2 is
not uniformly supported: while in the CONLOW condition subjects
are more likely to have relations that increase others’ outcomes,
the opposite holds true in the CONHIGH condition. Hypothesis 3
is refuted, since subjects are significantly more likely to have
relations that increase inequality. When looking at the interaction
effects, we find that Hypothesis 4 is supported: subjects who act
more in line with self-interest in the ring game also act more in line
with self-interest in the network formation experiment. With
regard to Hypotheses 5 and 6, the results are not supportive, and
in the case of others’ outcomes we even find contradictory
evidence in the CONLOW condition. The lack of consistent
support for the hypotheses relating to others’ outcomes and
equality, both in terms of the main effect and in terms of the
interactions, questions whether our hypothesized mechanisms are
at work in these contexts. We elaborate on this issue below.
Results for the co-author model
Now we turn to the co-author model with low costs (COALOW).
While analyzing the co-author model we dropped the cases in
which someone connected to an isolate, because connecting to an
isolate increases own outcomes, others’ outcomes, and in many
cases also equality. Straightforward calculations show that the
change in own outcome equals the change in others’ outcomes
exactly if one connects to an isolate. These decisions create high
correlations between the variables of interest, which causes
problems in the statistical analyses.
Model 2c in Table 2 shows positive effects of own outcomes and
others’ outcomes, and a negative effect of equality. Again, we find
that a larger concern for own outcomes in the ring game relates to
a larger concern for own outcomes in network formation. For
equality, we find that those caring more strongly about equality in
the ring game also do so during network formation, while for
others’ outcomes we find no such relation. If we analyze the co-
author model with high costs (COAHIGH), we find that the main
effects are positive for own outcome and others’ outcomes and
insignificant for equality. With regard to the interaction terms, we
find that a significant positive effect for others’ outcomes; those
caring more for others’ outcomes in the ring game also do so
during network formation. Furthermore, those who care more
about equality in the ring game, care less about equality during
network formation. As with the connections models discussed
previously, and not visible in the tables, it is worth noting that
almost the entire improvement in model fit between Models 1 and
2 comes from adding main effects, while interactions explain little
variance in the data.
In short, as with the connections model, Hypothesis 1 regarding
a positive effect of own outcomes is consistently supported. Now,
Hypothesis 2 is also supported: relations that increase others’
outcomes are more likely to form. Subjects seem to desire relations
that increase inequality or to be indifferent with regards to
inequality, in contrast with Hypothesis 3. The evidence for social
preferences is mixed (Hypotheses 4 through 6). In the COALOW
condition, we find support for Hypotheses 4 and 6 regarding the
concern for own outcome and equality. In contrast, we only find
support for Hypothesis 5 regarding the weight given to others’
Table 2. Logistic regression results for the COALOW and COAHIGH conditions.
COALOW COAHIGH
Model 1c Model 2c Model 1d Model 2d
Fixed effects
Constant 20.476 (0.000) 20.990 (0.000) 21.588 (0.000) 21.035 (0.000)
Creation of relation 3.130 (0.000) 3.173 (0.000) 2.542 (0.000) 2.578 (0.000)
Own outcome 4.536 (0.000) 2.808 (0.000)
Others’ outcomes 1.850 (0.000) 0.299 (0.000)
Equality 20.216 (0.000) 0.000 (1.000)
W1 * own outcome 3.241 (0.001) 20.166 (0.782)
W2 * others’ outcomes 0.247 (0.618) 0.307 (0.024)
W3 * equality 0.506 (0.003) 20.235 (0.052)
Random effects
Session 0.241 0.285 0.000 0.000
Decision maker 0.952 0.841 0.618 0.424
Directed dyad 0.405 0.178 0.743 0.515
Number of sessions 16 16 16 16
Number of decision makers 202 202 200 200
Number of directed dyads 2874 2874 1892 1892
Number of decisions 14514 14514 8867 8867
Log likelihood 26210.83 25981.53 24738.71 24363.51
The table shows the hierarchical four-level logistic regression estimates on whether (1) or not (0) a relation is present after an evaluation moment in the COALOW and
the COAHIGH conditions. Definitions of variables are as in Table 2. Random effects are estimated at the level of the session, the decision maker, and the directed dyad
under consideration. Numbers of sessions, decision makers, directed dyads, and decisions are given, as are the log likelihoods. P-values are in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276.t002
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outcomes in the COAHIGH condition. Again, behavior is not or
hardly affected by social preferences although we do find a strong
and consistent main effect of others’ outcomes. Because this effect
is not consistently moderated by the individual measurement of
social preferences, it cannot be ruled out that this behavioral
pattern emerges through a mechanism distinct from intrinsic social
preferences. Overall, we thus do not find consistent evidence for
effects of social preferences on the network formation decisions in
this experiment. Below, we elaborate on the robustness of our
Table 3. Robustness analyses of logistic regression results.
Main Alternative evaluation moment
Alternative crucial
actor Alternative reference group
2 sec 3 sec 4 sec 5 sec Network Link
A. CONLOW
Own outcome 3.806 (0.000) 3.979 (0.000) 3.959 (0.000) 3.878 (0.000) 3.832 (0.000) 2.730 (0.000) 3.807 (0.000) 3.697 (0.000)
Others’ outcomes 0.242 (0.011) 0.165 (0.076) 0.154 (0.096) 0.132 (0.151) 0.121 (0.183) 1.568 (0.000) 0.420 (0.000) 0.216 (0.000)
Equality 20.202 (0.000) 20.200 (0.000) 20.209 (0.000) 20.216 (0.000) 20.220 (0.000) 20.176 (0.000) 20.156 (0.000) 20.025 (0.000)
W1 * own outcome 0.986 (0.001) 0.533 (0.072) 0.312 (0.297) 0.286 (0.333) 0.355 (0.226) 0.984 (0.001) 0.928 (0.001) 1.067 (0.000)
W2 * others’ outcomes 20.941 (0.001) 21.094 (0.000) 21.092 (0.000) 21.193 (0.000) 21.223 (0.000) 20.773 (0.003) 20.545 (0.011) 20.249 (0.118)
W3 * equality 0.060 (0.691) 0.175 (0.237) 0.071 (0.628) 0.056 (0.696) 0.131 (0.358) 20.003 (0.982) 0.111 (0.141) 0.123 (0.001)
Number of decisions 21208 21034 20894 20803 20708 21208 21208 21208
Log likelihood 29903.68 210312.97 210495.91 210667.64 210765.08 210739.90 29858.45 29911.90
B. CONHIGH
Own outcome 2.917 (0.000) 2.992 (0.000) 2.973 (0.000) 2.945 (0.000) 2.915 (0.000) 1.707 (0.000) 2.867 (0.000) 2.876 (0.000)
Others’ outcomes 20.172 (0.050) 20.275 (0.001) 20.324 (0.000) 20.334 (0.000) 20.413 (0.000) 1.336 (0.000) 20.100 (0.087) 20.109 (0.007)
Equality 20.165 (0.000) 20.170 (0.000) 20.164 (0.000) 20.171 (0.000) 20.182 (0.000) 20.108 (0.000) 20.073 (0.000) 20.022 (0.000)
W1 * own outcome 0.729 (0.001) 0.765 (0.001) 0.753 (0.001) 0.672 (0.003) 0.591 (0.008) 0.564 (0.008) 0.733 (0.001) 0.729 (0.001)
W2 * others’ outcomes 20.072 (0.767) 0.001 (0.998) 20.037 (0.877) 0.044 (0.851) 20.074 (0.753) 20.066 (0.773) 20.005 (0.977) 20.054 (0.685)
W3 * equality 0.037 (0.792) 0.120 (0.378) 0.145 (0.282) 0.179 (0.177) 0.124 (0.348) 20.026 (0.840) 0.005 (0.939) 20.029 (0.283)
Number of decisions 19997 19829 19689 19567 19472 19997 19997 19997
Log likelihood 29396.76 29940.49 210160.33 210263.39 210362.14 210422.29 29398.19 29409.32
C. COALOW
Own outcome 4.536 (0.000) 4.224 (0.000) 3.895 (0.000) 3.609 (0.000) 3.462 (0.000) 3.707 (0.000) 3.576 (0.000) 2.970 (0.000)
Others’ outcomes 1.850 (0.000) 1.763 (0.000) 1.720 (0.000) 1.621 (0.000) 1.563 (0.000) 1.777 (0.000) 0.994 (0.000) 23.318 (0.000)
Equality 20.216 (0.000) 20.167 (0.000) 20.140 (0.000) 20.123 (0.000) 20.107 (0.000) 20.153 (0.000) 20.026 (0.003) 20.043 (0.008)
W1 * own outcome 3.241 (0.001) 3.028 (0.001) 2.495 (0.004) 2.415 (0.004) 2.351 (0.004) 2.271 (0.009) 3.035 (0.002) 2.654 (0.006)
W2 * others’ outcomes 0.247 (0.618) 0.686 (0.138) 0.608 (0.175) 0.743 (0.095) 0.479 (0.271) 0.344 (0.488) 0.165 (0.796) 20.459 (0.446)
W3 * equality 0.506 (0.003) 0.441 (0.005) 0.351 (0.020) 0.287 (0.049) 0.316 (0.028) 0.476 (0.004) 0.105 (0.041) 0.185 (0.060)
Number of decisions 14514 14372 14280 14208 14160 14514 14514 14514
Log likelihood 25981.53 26702.57 27079.85 27347.49 27494.88 26051.47 26053.45 25932.72
D. COAHIGH
Own outcome 2.808 (0.000) 3.053 (0.000) 3.054 (0.000) 2.984 (0.000) 2.952 (0.000) 1.686 (0.000) 2.672 (0.000) 2.672 (0.000)
Others’ outcomes 0.299 (0.000) 0.371 (0.000) 0.376 (0.000) 0.349 (0.000) 0.367 (0.000) 0.323 (0.000) 0.185 (0.013) 0.183 (0.014)
Equality 0.000 (1.000) 20.016 (0.483) 0.002 (0.914) 20.006 (0.784) 20.011 (0.618) 0.089 (0.000) 0.012 (0.073) 0.012 (0.072)
W1 * own outcome 20.166 (0.782) 20.554 (0.360) 20.902 (0.142) 20.897 (0.144) 21.231 (0.049) 20.075 (0.891) 20.017 (0.977) 20.017 (0.977)
W2 * others’ outcomes 0.307 (0.024) 0.269 (0.038) 0.275 (0.035) 0.240 (0.066) 0.350 (0.010) 0.388 (0.009) 0.609 (0.001) 0.596 (0.001)
W3 * equality 20.235 (0.052) 20.228 (0.046) 20.246 (0.032) 20.330 (0.004) 20.344 (0.003) 20.300 (0.018) 20.006 (0.875) 20.006 (0.883)
Number of decisions 8867 8775 8692 8636 8592 8867 8867 8867
Log likelihood 24363.51 24851.48 24993.94 25068.34 25096.59 24535.35 24378.21 24383.27
The table shows hierarchical four-level logistic regression estimates on whether (1) or not (0) a relation is present after an evaluation moment in the four conditions of
our experiment. The first columns depict the main results. Subsequent columns show the results if we employ alternative assumptions in our econometric model. The
alternative assumptions concern the length of the evaluation moment (how long do subjects take to evaluate a relationship, original assumption being one second),
the way the crucial actor is defined in case two actors decide to keep a link (original definition is the one who initiated the link, alternative definition being the one with
the lowest earnings from the link), and the definition of the reference group (original assumption being all others, alternatives are only those to whom one is directly
connected (Network) or only the subject with whom one is currently considering a relationship (Link)). Random effects are estimated at the level of the session, the
decision maker, and the directed dyad under consideration. To keep the table readable, we only report coefficients relating to the hypotheses, the overall number of
decisions, and the log likelihood. Definitions of variables are as in Table 2. P-values are in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276.t003
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results and some alternative explanations for the effects of the
social preference variables reported above.
Robustness analyses
At this stage, it is important to investigate the robustness of our
results to some of the assumptions in our analyses. In particular,
we assumed an evaluation time of one second after a decision to
create or remove a link. Here we investigate whether lengthening
the evaluation time influences our results. Furthermore, when a
link was created and both subjects ‘‘decided’’ to keep the link we
assumed that the subject making the initial decision was the crucial
decision maker, because this subject would be more likely to
actively evaluate the situation before and after the creation of a
relationship. Here we investigate whether altering this assumption,
by designating the subjects winning least (or losing most) from the
relationship as the crucial decision maker, influences our results.
Finally, we assumed that subjects computed other’s outcomes and
equality on the basis of all subjects in the network. Here we
investigate whether assuming that subjects frame more narrowly,
either only considering those with whom they have a relationship
or the particular subjects with whom they are currently
considering a relationship, affects the results. Table 3 depicts the
estimates under these alternative assumptions.
We find that estimates are very stable if we lengthen the
evaluation moments, both in terms of the magnitude of coefficients
and the degree of statistical significance. Two exceptions occur in
the CONLOW condition, where the effects of others’ outcomes and
the interaction between caring about own outcomes in the ring
and own outcomes in the network game drop in significance if the
evaluation moment is taken to be longer.
Adjusting the crucial decision maker when a link is created and
maintained to be the subject who earns least (or loses most) from
the relationship, rather than the one who initially made the
change, also does not change the main conclusions. We do,
however, observe that the coefficient on own outcomes decreases
in all cases whereas the coefficient on others’ outcomes increases in
three of the four conditions (CONLOW, CONHIGH, COAHIGH). In
the CONHIGH condition, it even switches from being significantly
negative to being significantly positive. Furthermore, the empirical
fit drops considerably in all four conditions after we make this
change. These two patterns suggest that the original specification
was more accurate and that the alternative assumption causes the
‘‘more important’’ own outcomes to be erroneously included in
others’ outcomes.
Finally, adjusting the reference group also does not alter the
conclusions. If we assume that subjects focus either on the subset of
subjects to whom they are connected or simply to the subject with
whom they are currently evaluating a connection, we do not come
to drastically different conclusions. Overall, patterns found are
remarkably similar between different reference group specifica-
tions.
Ordering effects
Next to the robustness to specific assumptions made in the
analyses, one can ask whether the order in which subjects faced the
different conditions influenced their behavior. Such ordering
effects can be interesting as they relate to learning. One major
assumption in the theoretical literature and the current analyses is
that subjects are myopic, purely responding to current outcomes of
relations when making their choices. If this assumption is valid,
learning opportunities should have little to no effect on behavior. If
subjects show foresight and strive to reach certain network
positions in the long run, however, learning might have an effect.
As subjects gather their own experiences and observe successful
strategies of others, they might acquire a better understanding of
how to maximize their long-run earnings.
Table 4 depicts the estimates for each condition depending on
whether it was the first, second, third, or fourth condition in the
experiment. Panels A and B show the results for the CONLOW and
CONHIGH condition respectively. There seems to be no clear
trend if subjects have acquired more experience in these
conditions. Overall, the positive effect of own outcomes occurs
consistently in both conditions, as does the negative effect of
equality. For the other variables, results are less robust. The effect
of others’ outcomes and the interactions do not show a consistent
pattern across the two conditions.
With respect to learning, the co-author conditions are arguably
more interesting than the connections conditions as one can
imagine that subjects who are unfamiliar with network formation
games will fail to recognize its social dilemma structure. Having
gained some experience with network formation subjects might
enable subjects to recognize this structure more readily and adjust
their behavior accordingly.
Table 4, Panels C and D report the results for the COALOW and
COAHIGH conditions respectively. As for the connections models,
we find a consistent positive effect of own outcomes on behavior.
Furthermore, the effect of equality is consistently negative in the
COALOW condition and consistently absent in the COAHIGH
condition. For the interaction variables, no clear patterns emerge.
The most interesting pattern, however, concerns others’
outcomes. If subjects face a co-author condition as the first
condition in the experiment they appear to put no weight on the
outcomes of others (COALOW) or even give them a negative
weight (COAHIGH). However, if subjects had previous experience
with network formation tasks, they consistently attach a positive
weight to others’ outcomes. It is important to realize that due to
the social dilemma nature of these tasks, others’ outcomes are
positively related with the subject’s long-term self-interest, and
negatively with the person’s short-term self-interest. These findings
are thus in line with the assumption that subjects need some
experience with network formation to foresee what is in their own
long-term self-interest. This reasoning implies that the positive
coefficients on others’ outcomes may result from strategic decisions
in accordance with long-term self-interest rather than pure altruistic
preferences. Similar arguments are also found in other more
complex experimental settings [35,71,72].
Finally, the fact that no clear patterns emerge for the social
preference interactions is further evidence that such preferences
are not of real importance in any of our conditions.
Decisions in dyads
Social preferences as measured by the ring game seem to play a
role in a wide array of decision tasks, but not in these network
formation games. In this section, we investigate whether social
preferences, in particular altruistic preferences, do play a role in a
subset of decisions in the network that more closely mirror the task
in which they were elicited.
Recall that the measurements of social preferences are derived
from a simple, two-person context. One subject could decide
between outcome distributions for herself and a random other
subject. This decision situation does not only put all the focus on
one specific other subject, it also makes the decision maker directly
responsible for how much the other receives. It turns out that in
the COAHIGH condition, subjects frequently encounter decisions
that mirror these properties. In particular, a considerable part of
the decisions in the COAHIGH condition concern the choice
between staying in a mutually exclusive dyad—i.e., two actors who
only have a relation with each other and no relations with other
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actors—and creating an additional relation. Forming an additional
relation when one is in a dyad dramatically decreases the
outcomes of the dyadic partner by 20 points per minute. In
contrast, one’s own outcomes decrease only marginally, depending
on the number of relations of the subject with whom one is
creating this additional relation (see Figure 4). Similar to the ring
game, the dyadic state likely creates a focus on the outcomes of one
particular other, namely the dyadic partner, and the subject is
directly responsible for the partner’s outcomes. Despite the fact
that the subject’s own earnings decrease by the creation of an
additional link, subject might make such a choice due to error, in
the hope that they can maneuver themselves in a more profitable
position in the long run, because they put a negative weight on the
outcome of the partner, or because they have a preference for
outperforming someone else. However, the more subjects value
outcomes of others in two-person situations, the less likely they
should be to create such relations.
We employ the same pairwise comparison analysis as before,
with two exceptions. First, we only look at situations where the
pairwise comparison comes down to comparing the option of
Table 4. Logistic regression results on ordering of conditions in experiment.
Main Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 4
A. CONLOW
Own outcome 3.806 (0.000) 3.667 (0.000) 3.629 (0.000) 3.521 (0.000) 4.923 (0.000)
Others’ outcomes 0.242 (0.011) 0.499 (0.019) 0.070 (0.679) 20.035 (0.850) 0.611 (0.013)
Equality 20.202 (0.000) 20.333 (0.000) 20.236 (0.000) 20.269 (0.000) 20.118 (0.078)
W1 * own outcome 0.986 (0.001) 20.210 (0.717) 1.648 (0.002) 0.530 (0.367) 2.845 (0.000)
W2 * others’ outcomes 20.941 (0.001) 21.651 (0.001) 20.144 (0.786) 20.640 (0.313) 20.208 (0.755)
W3 * equality 0.060 (0.691) 0.082 (0.820) 0.854 (0.001) 21.223 (0.000) 20.024 (0.948)
Number of decisions 21208 5355 6058 5334 4461
Log likelihood 29903.68 22417.19 22864.73 22550.78 21937.92
B. CONHIGH
Own outcome 2.917 (0.000) 2.227 (0.000) 2.995 (0.000) 3.187 (0.000) 3.199 (0.000)
Others’ outcomes 20.172 (0.050) 0.164 (0.423) 20.299 (0.057) 0.026 (0.890) 20.558 (0.001)
Equality 20.165 (0.000) 20.262 (0.000) 20.117 (0.009) 20.108 (0.029) 20.221 (0.000)
W1 * own outcome 0.729 (0.001) 2.259 (0.000) 0.495 (0.192) 1.583 (0.003) 20.460 (0.321)
W2 * others’ outcomes 20.072 (0.767) 0.293 (0.738) 0.014 (0.967) 0.643 (0.187) 20.435 (0.387)
W3 * equality 0.037 (0.792) 0.596 (0.066) 20.444 (0.055) 0.270 (0.412) 0.088 (0.762)
Number of decisions 19997 3528 6037 5259 5173
Log likelihood 29396.76 21567.76 22818.06 22479.22 22406.10
C. COALOW
Own outcome 4.536 (0.000) 4.264 (0.000) 4.531 (0.000) 3.522 (0.000) 4.841 (0.000)
Others’ outcomes 1.850 (0.000) 0.862 (0.145) 1.597 (0.000) 2.590 (0.000) 1.778 (0.000)
Equality 20.216 (0.000) 20.225 (0.006) 20.177 (0.002) 20.326 (0.001) 20.242 (0.000)
W1 * own outcome 3.241 (0.001) 0.343 (0.915) 3.002 (0.047) 4.512 (0.110) 3.998 (0.013)
W2 * others’ outcomes 0.247 (0.618) 20.089 (0.964) 1.376 (0.051) 0.373 (0.848) 20.766 (0.390)
W3 * equality 0.506 (0.003) 0.117 (0.864) 0.206 (0.502) 0.897 (0.167) 0.664 (0.004)
Number of decisions 14514 4329 2156 4667 3362
Log likelihood 25981.53 21778.75 2963.03 21799.69 21403.10
D. COAHIGH
Own outcome 2.808 (0.000) 2.906 (0.000) 2.949 (0.000) 2.783 (0.000) 2.570 (0.000)
Others’ outcomes 0.299 (0.000) 20.654 (0.009) 0.509 (0.000) 0.235 (0.004) 0.358 (0.000)
Equality 0.000 (1.000) 0.024 (0.670) 20.080 (0.153) 20.043 (0.294) 0.036 (0.486)
W1 * own outcome 20.166 (0.782) 2.384 (0.039) 1.501 (0.292) 20.895 (0.387) 22.213 (0.092)
W2 * others’ outcomes 0.307 (0.024) 20.017 (0.969) 0.130 (0.622) 0.311 (0.281) 0.324 (0.156)
W3 * equality 20.235 (0.052) 20.241 (0.519) 20.394 (0.078) 0.030 (0.880) 20.160 (0.675)
Number of decisions 8867 2819 1356 3024 1668
Log likelihood 24363.51 21357.37 2536.61 21571.42 2834.66
The table shows the hierarchical four-level logistic regression estimates on whether (1) or not (0) a relation is present after an evaluation moment in the four conditions
in our experiment. The first columns depict the main results. Subsequent columns show the results if we restrict ourselves to the case where the particular condition
was the first, second, third, or fourth condition in the experiment. Random effects are estimated at the level of the session, the decision maker, and the directed dyad
under consideration. As in Table 3, we restrict our attention to the social preference coefficients, the overall number of decisions, and the log likelihoods. Definitions are
as in Table 2. P-values are in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276.t004
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being in a mutually exclusive dyad with the option to add another
relation in the COAHIGH condition. Second, we assume that
subjects focus on the dyadic partner when assessing the social
consequences of the decision. Table 5 displays the results. Note
that this analysis includes only a subset of potential variables. In
particular, we are unable to estimate a main effect for the weight
given to the partner’s outcome, as the partner’s outcomes always
differ by 20 points when comparing the situation with the link to
the situation without the link. The interaction effect between
partner’s outcome and altruistic preferences can be estimated,
however, because subjects with different social preferences can put
different weight on this 20-point outcome reduction. Next to this,
we completely neglect the effect of equality in the current model.
The reason being that since the change in the partner’s outcome is
constant, the difference in equality with or without the link is
simply a non-linear transformation of the effect that the link has on
the subject’s own outcomes. This creates a very strong correlation
(Pearson correlation coefficient of 20.977) between own outcomes
and equality.
Consistent with earlier analyses, Table 5 shows that subjects are
more likely to keep or maintain a link if this link increases their
own outcomes. Now, however, we do not find that putting a larger
weight on own outcomes in the ring game significantly influences
the weight given to the own outcomes in the network formation
tasks. In sharp contrast to our other findings, however, we find a
significant effect for social preferences regarding the partner’s
outcomes: subjects that give a higher weight to others’ outcomes in
the ring game attach a significantly higher weight to the outcome
reduction of the dyadic partner. Further analyses, not reported
here, indicate that this effect is stable over different lengths of the
evaluation period and for using the alternative assumption
regarding the crucial decision maker. This suggests that social
preferences as measured by the ring game matter during network
formation if subjects find themselves in a situation in which their
actions have a strong impact on another subject for whom they
have a reason to feel responsible. Also, this provides evidence that
we have valid social preferences measurements and, therefore, that
the lack of effects found in the full set of decisions has a substantive
interpretation.
Conclusion and Discussion
Empirical evidence suggests that people purposively build their
social network in order to attain favorable outcomes. This idea has
been formalized in theoretical models on network formation,
which typically assume myopic self-interest on the side of the
actors. Myopic implies that actors only care about the direct
consequences of their decisions, while self-interest implies that
actors only care about their own outcomes. Experimental evidence
suggests that such theories predict network structures well when
the outcomes are equal over all actors, but that the predicted
networks are seldom formed if they provide unequal outcomes
over the actors involved [28,29]. As these experiments closely
match the theoretical environment, this suggests that one needs to
relax the micro-level assumption of either myopia or pure self-
interest in order to improve the macro-level predictions. Given the
large literature on social preferences, and the complexity involved
when one wants to relax the assumption of myopia, it may come as
no surprise that the most advocated strategy is to relax the
assumption of self-interest [28–31]. In the current paper, we report
on an experiment designed to systematically investigate the role of
social preferences in network formation. In particular, we
investigated whether behavior in network formation can be
related to independent measures of an individual’s social
preferences.
We developed an experiment in which subjects interacted
anonymously in network formation games. We set up this
experiment in a way as to maximize our ability to analyze
individual decisions. In our experiment, (1) subjects could make
changes continuously and received continuous feedback on what
the others were doing, (2) there were direct monetary incentives to
forming and removing links in the network, and (3) groups were
large in size.
Subjects formed networks in four different conditions. As
predicted, subjects were found to be more likely to create and
maintain relations that increase their own outcomes in the network
in each of the conditions. When it comes to altruism results were
less clear. We only found consistent evidence for the claim that
others’ outcomes influence network decisions in the two co-author
conditions. In these conditions, others’ outcomes are positively
related with long-term self-interest. Therefore, the positive effect of
others’ outcomes potentially indicates that subjects foresee what is
in their long-term self-interest, rather than altruism. This claim is
supported by the fact that the positive effect of others’ outcomes
does not show up in conditions at the beginning of the experiment,
when recognizing what is in one’s own long-term self-interest is
arguably more difficult. Earlier experiments have also found that
farsighted behavior often has to develop in the course of the
experiment [35]. This suggests that relaxing the assumption of
myopia in order to improve macro-level predictions should not be
ruled out a priori.
Table 5. Logistic regression results for dyadic decisions in the
COAHIGH condition.
COAHIGH dyadic decisions
Model 1e Model 2e
Fixed effects
Constant 23.035 (0.000) 22.591 (0.000)
Creation of relation 2.667 (0.000) 2.681 (0.000)
Own outcome 0.901 (0.000)
W1 * own outcome 0.659 (0.466)
W2 * partner’s outcome 7.050 (0.001)
Random effects
Session 0.000 0.000
Decision maker 0.846 0.796
Directed dyad 0.000 0.000
Number of sessions 16 16
Number of decision makers 162 162
Number of directed dyads 545 545
Number of decisions 1426 1426
Log likelihood 2571.42 2554.51
The table shows the hierarchical four-level logistic regression estimates on
whether (1) or not (0) a relation is present after an evaluation moment in the
COAHIGH conditions. We only look at situations where the pairwise comparison
comes down to comparing the option of being in a mutually exclusive dyad
with the option to add another link. We assume that subjects focus on the
dyadic partner when assessing the social consequences of the link. Random
effects are estimated at the level of the session, the decision maker, and the
directed dyad under consideration. Note that this analysis includes only a
subset of potential variables. In particular, the main effect for the weight given
to the partner’s outcome is omitted as it is constant at -20 by construction.
Furthermore, we omit the variables relating to equality. Otherwise, definitions
are as in Table 2. P-values are in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276.t005
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With respect to equality, our estimates suggest that subjects
strived for inequality. The argument that people strive for
inequality, however, seems unlikely considering the past findings
on interdependent decision-making. It is important to note that
the effect only consistently appeared in the connections conditions.
In these settings, self-interested behavior (possibly combined with a
concern for altruism) leads to unequal networks. We cannot
completely rule out that the negative effect of equality appears
because we are unable to perfectly control for self-interest. Next to
this, as subjects do not appear to act in a myopic fashion in the co-
author conditions, we cannot rule out that subjects might also use
more complex decisions rules in the connections model. As our
empirical model assumes myopic decision-making, such alterna-
tive decision rules might bias our estimates: what seems to be an
effect of a preference for inequality might be an unintended
consequence of more complex decision rules. Still, if the argument
that subjects have a strong preference for networks that provide
equal outcomes was correct, we would expect it to trump these
other considerations. It did not, and therefore we can take the
findings as reasonable arguments against a prominent role of a
preference for equality in these network formation conditions.
We measured social preferences outside a network context by
allowing people to choose between sets of own-other outcome
distributions. When we relate the behavior in the network to
measures of social preferences, we see that they barely ever have
an effect; social preferences never contribute substantially to the
explained variance. The only finding that occurs somewhat
consistently is that those who care more about their own outcomes
in the ring game seem to care more about their own outcomes in
the network as well. This is not to say that social preferences do
not play a role in network formation at all. When we selected cases
in which the network formation choice came down to a two-
person decision task in which one subject’s choice had a
considerable effect on the outcomes of a focal other subject, we
did find social preferences to be an important predictor of
behavior. This result suggests that the measurements of social
preferences derived from choices over sets of own-other outcome
distributions can predict behavior in similar contexts, but will not
straightforwardly generalize to more complex network formation
settings. Below, we sketch three explanations for this discrepancy.
First, the complexity of the situation might make it too difficult
for subjects to determine which choice is most in line with their
social preferences. In a two-person setting, or the multi-person
setting that is provided by a public goods game, one’s own choices
have straightforward consequences for the others; either positive
or negative. In a network this is not the case, which makes it more
difficult for a person to assess whether a choice is in line with her
personal preferences. What should one do if one cares for others’
outcomes, but the outcomes for some increase while those of
others decrease? Or if one cares about equality but the equality
between some increases while the inequality between others
decreases? Such considerations are complex and might hamper
the role of social preferences in a network context. This complexity
is even greater if subjects are not entirely myopic, because the
decision task is much more complex in this case.
Second, the complexity might provide subjects with an excuse to
alleviate feelings of responsibility. It has been found that people are
less likely to display pro-social behavior if they can shift the
responsibility for an outcome to third parties [73]. In a network, a
number of actors influence the results. Even if a subject would try
to increase others’ outcomes or equality, it is likely that the choices
of others will undo this, either intentionally or unintentionally.
Realizing this, actors may choose to strictly focus on their own
interest.
Finally, the complexity might trigger a different decision-making
process. It has been shown that intuitive decision-making fosters
cooperative choices, whereas greater reflection undermines
cooperative impulses [74]. The increased complexity that
networks provide may lead subjects to employ greater reflection
as compared to simple settings, decreasing the importance of social
preferences.
As a note on the experimental design, it is important to stress
that our experiment focused on income streams rather than
accumulated earnings as a relevant criterion to which social
preferences relate. Indeed, it would be very difficult if not
impossible for our subjects to keep a reasonable count of overall
outcomes for all or several subjects in the experiment. We chose
this approach as it is in line with the way that social preferences are
often employed in experiments and the way in which network
formation experiments have been conducted in the past. Future
research, however, should investigate the importance of this
assumption for our results by allowing subjects to view running
averages of outcomes in the course of network formation.
With regard to broader implications, we find that social
preferences do not play a major role in the complex process of
network formation. Interestingly, we do find evidence suggesting
that subjects are able to learn what is in their own long-term self-
interest and to decide accordingly. These two results suggest that
in order to improve macro-predictions of game-theoretic models of
network formation, extending the micro-foundations to include
some form of farsightedness may be a more promising direction
than the inclusion of social preferences, at least in some contexts.
While social preferences do not seem to play a role in the majority
of decisions in our networks, we do find social preferences operate
when the decision degenerates to a two-person decision task in
which one is solely responsible for the outcome of one other
person. For many relational decisions in the real world, we can
imagine that people feel such a responsibility towards specific
others. It would be interesting to systematically investigate under
which conditions people frame situations in such a way that makes
social preferences relevant, and in which conditions they do not.
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